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This paper addresses the issue of how relational rents, generated through alliances, are
distributed to the participating firms. We argue that rent distribution is influenced by factors
affecting both jointly generated common benefits and private benefits gained from the alliance
relationship. We draw on four perspectives to explain these various effects. The first three,
namely the resource dependence perspective, related resources perspective, and structural
holes perspective, essentially highlight the private ‘exploitation’ opportunities that a firm’s
alliance network presents the focal firm. In contrast, the resource development perspective
underscores the private ‘exploration’ benefits a firm potentially derives from its alliance
network. Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades we have witnessed an
extraordinary increase in the number of alliances
(non-market relationships) between firms. Indeed,
alliances, which are supported by neoclassical or
relational contracts rather than the classical
contracts that support market relationships (Wil-
liamson, 1985), have become one of the most
important organizational forms in both the United
States and other market economies. More than
10, 000 alliances were reported by US firms in 2000
and alliances grew at a 19% annual rate from 1996
to 2000 (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Forbes, 2001).
With the growth in alliances and strategic net-
works, Dyer and Singh (1998) as well as Gulati
et al. (2000) have made the case that dyads and
networks of firms are an increasingly important
unit of analysis for explaining supernormal
profits and the competitive advantage of firms.
The idea that alliances generate relational rents1
and are an important vehicle for value creation is
supported by numerous studies which suggest
that, on average, alliances do create economic
value (McConnell and Nantel, 1985; Koh and
Venkatraman, 1991; Anand and Khanna, 2000;
Kale et al., 2002).
But while there is increasing evidence that
alliances are an important source of value creation
and competitive advantage, we know less about
how collaborating firms split the value (rents) that
are generated as a result of the collaboration. Why
are some firms able to generate greater total
benefits from participating in alliances and net-
works? Why do some firms appropriate more of
the rents? Previous research on alliances has
focused largely on the reasons for alliance forma-
tion, the characteristics of alliance success or
failure, and the sources of competitive advantage
that can be derived through alliances. But less
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attention has been paid to how total ‘relational
rents’ are generated and distributed among
alliance partners.
In this paper we address the issue of how
relational rents generated through alliances are
distributed to the participating firms. We develop
an overarching framework which divides the total
benefits that a firm can generate from an alliance
relationship into ‘common benefits,’ or benefits to
both parties based upon the alliance’s specific
objectives as well as ‘private benefits’ or gain’s that
are realized only by individual firms in the alliance
(Khanna et al., 1998). We then suggest that core
arguments of resource dependence theory help best
explain how the common benefits are split among
parties based upon the nature of the resource
dependence between them. On the other hand,
the total private benefits that a firm can generate
from an alliance relationship can only be under-
stood by using a combination of theoretical
perspectives which we label: related resources
perspective, structural holes perspective, and
resource development perspective. We develop
the theoretical arguments from each perspective
and use specific case studies to illustrate how
relational rents are generated and appropriated
in alliance relationships. We also illustrate the
interdependent nature of a firm’s ability to
generate and balance common and private benefits
and discuss the implications of our analysis
for alliance formation and stability. Finally, we
discuss the policy implications for alliance man-
agers and executives.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE
GENERATION AND DIVISION OF
RELATIONAL RENTS FROM AN ALLIANCE
At first glance, the distribution of rents in an
alliance relationship appears straightforward.
Each firm brings some resources to the table
which, when combined, are able to synergistically
generate more value than would be possible if the
resources were kept separate. The two parties
estimate the size of the pie to be created and then
negotiate a split of that pie. According to the
resource dependence perspective, we would expect
that the partners who bring the more critical
(i.e., scarce) resources to the relationship will
be able to appropriate a higher percentage of the
rents (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However, this
perspective alone explains the distribution of
relational rents only if neither of the two firms
generates any private benefits from the alliance
relationship. In many cases firms enter an alliance
relationship to achieve goals that are not specifi-
cally related to the stated objectives of the alliance.
Thus, with regard to the distribution of common
(direct) benefits of the alliance relationship, the
resource dependence perspective is critical for
explaining the distribution of rents. However, it
is important to distinguish between common and
private benefits. In some cases, firms may enter an
alliance relationship to generate private benefits
that may not be apparent to the alliance partner,
and therefore are not considered in the negotia-
tions that split the common benefits from the
alliance. Consequently, it is important to under-
stand that while resource dependence theory may
be adequate to describe the ex ante distribution of
common benefits, it is inadequate in its ability to
explain how and why some firms generate greater
private benefits from an alliance relationship.
The private benefits that result from an alliance
can be explained through three other theoretical
approaches:
1. Related resources perspective. The ability of the
firm to exploit knowledge/resources acquired
through the alliance by combining them
with related/complementary resources within
the firm.
2. Structural holes perspective (Burt, 1992). The
ability of the firm to exploit knowledge/
resources acquired through the alliance by
combining them with the resources that reside
within other firms within the firm’s network.
3. Resource development perspective. The ability to
exploit knowledge/resources acquired through
the alliance by using it to determine what
resources/capabilities the firm should invest in
developing in the future.
In summary, the total benefits that can be
generated through an alliance are the sum of
common benefits plus private benefits. The divi-
sion of those total benefits between the alliance
partners depends not only on resource dependency
theory, but also the theoretical contributions of
the related resources perspective, structural holes
perspective, and the resource development per-
spective (see Figure 1). We examine each of these
theories in greater detail and apply them directly
to the distribution of relational rents in alliances.
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SPLITTING COMMON BENEFITS FROM
AN ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP
Resource Dependence Perspective
The first perspective, which has already been well
developed in the literature, is the resource depen-
dence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
According to the resource dependence perspective,
partners who bring the more critical or scarce
resources to the relationship (in Barney’s 1991
VRIO framework, these would be resources that
are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substituta-
ble) will have more bargaining power and be able
to appropriate a higher percentage of the rents
in ex ante negotiations (see Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978; Asanuma, 1989; Barney, 1991). However, as
Coff (1999) has shown in his study of bargaining
power between knowledge-based employees and
firms, this assumes that both parties have a shared
understanding with regard to the extent to which
each partner possesses resources that are valuable,
rare, and non-substitutable (VRIO resources) and
the extent to which those resources contribute to
the creation of a pie. In short, each partner will
determine the extent to which the partner can
easily be replaced and how replacing a partner
will influence the size of the common benefits
created as well as the distribution of those benefits.
Thus, a key success factor in appropriating
value in an alliance relationship is convincing
your partner that you possess VRIO resources and
that the partner’s share of the pie created
(common benefits) will be greater than with any
other partner.
Research in the automotive industry provides a
nice illustration of resource dependence theory and
how it influences the distribution of relational
rents. During the 1980–1997 time period, Toyota
and its partner suppliers (a ‘partner’ supplier is
defined as one of roughly 20 key suppliers in which
Toyota maintains a minority equity stake) made
roughly 50% higher profits than did competing
automakers and their suppliers (Dyer, 1996, 2000).
Dyer argues that these relational rents are
largely generated by relationship-specific invest-
ments made by Toyota and its suppliers. For
example, Toyota and its suppliers had one-third
the inventory to sales ratio as GM, Ford, and
Chrysler in large part due to supplier investments
in dedicated plants located close to Toyota’s
plants, which lowered inventory and transporta-
tion costs. These investments contributed to the
higher joint profits (relational rents) enjoyed by
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Figure 1. Distribution of relational rents.
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both Toyota and its suppliers. However, Toyota
made much higher profits ðROA ¼ 13:0%Þ than its
partner suppliers (average ROA ¼ 7:1%) which
indicates that it was able to appropriate a greater
percentage of the gains to collaboration. A
primary reason that Toyota was able to appro-
priate a higher percentage of the gains was due to
their greater bargaining power (relative to suppli-
ers) and control over more valuable, rare,
and inimitable resources (brand equity, system
integration skills, manufacturing know-how, etc.).
Suppliers could not easily replace Toyota whereas
Toyota could more easily replace a given supplier.
However, some partner suppliers like Denso made
profit returns ðROA ¼ 12:8%Þ similar to those
of Toyota. Why? Because Denso, a supplier of
key electronic components, valve timing control
systems, heating and air conditioning systems, and
instrument panels, brought more valuable, rare,
and inimitable resources to the relationship
than did other supplier partners. Denso designs
and manufactures some of the more complex
automotive components that can only be supplied
by a few suppliers (fewer substitutes). In fact, a
large percentage of Denso’s component blueprints
during that time period were ‘blackbox’ blueprints,
meaning Denso would blacken out a box on
the component blueprint to keep the blueprint
proprietary, even from Toyota (see Clark and
Fujimoto, 1991; Dyer and Ouchi, 1993). As noted
by Clark and Fujimoto (1991, p. 142) ‘The black
box system is not without its downside risks.
Assemblers dependent on suppliers’ engineering
capabilities may lose some negotiation power.’ As
a result of possessing proprietary blueprints
and capabilities that allowed for delivery of low-
cost, high-quality components, Denso was able to
appropriate a greater percentage of the gains of
collaborating with Toyota relative to the typical
partner supplier. In contrast, Chuo Spring a
Toyota partner supplier of valve springs, control
cables, and leaf springs, made an ROA of roughly
7.5% during the same time period. Chuo
Spring provided parts to Toyota that typically
did not involve ‘black box’ blueprints and were not
nearly as complex to design and manufacture as
Denso’s parts. Moreover, there were roughly
twice as many suppliers in Japan who produced
Chuo’s major products compared to the
number of other suppliers who produced Denso’s
major products. As a result, Chuo was less
able than Denso to appropriate the gains
from its partnership relationship with Toyota
because its resources were less valuable, rare,
and inimitable.
Proposition 1a:
A firm in an alliance/network which brings the
more critical (i.e., valuable, rare, inimitable)
resources to the relationship will appropriate a
higher percentage of the total relational rents
generated from an alliance relationship.
While resource dependence will determine the
split of common benefits at the time the alliance is
initiated (ex ante bargaining power), the bargain-
ing power of partners can change over time
(ex post bargaining power). There are two main
factors which will influence bargaining power
over time: (1) the extent to which the partner
learns/acquires the VRIO resources of the
partner (thereby changing the relative value of
the partner’s VRIO resources), and (2) the extent
to which the partners make asymmetric invest-
ments in relation-specific assets.
In the first case, ex post bargaining power
changes as a result of one partner doing a
significantly better job of acquiring the partner’s
knowledge and resources. Naturally, this changes
the perception of the relative contributions of
the partners to the relationship. Hamel’s (1991)
detailed examination of nine alliances revealed
that the partners typically try to internalize the
partner’s skills while protecting their own. He
found cases where the alliance dissolved because
one partner had completely mastered the skills of
the other through significant investments in learn-
ing. As one manager in his study observed, ‘[Our
partner] tries to suck us dry of technology ideas
they can use in their own products.’ Thus, from a
dynamic perspective, when one firm does a
significantly better job of assimilating or replicat-
ing the knowledge and resources of its partner, this
will change the balance of bargaining power and
the distribution of relational rents over time in
favor of that firm.
Proposition 1b:
A firm in an alliance which has made greater
investments in acquiring or replicating the knowl-
edge and resources of its partner will increase its
bargaining power and appropriate a higher per-
centage of the subsequent relational rents gener-
ated from an alliance relationship.
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A second factor that will influence the distribu-
tion of common benefits over time in an alliance
relationship is the degree to which alliance
partners make asymmetrical investments in trans-
action-specific assets. As described by Klein et al.
(1978), transaction specific investments are valu-
able because they create appropriable quasi-rents,
or value above and beyond what could have been
generated through general purpose investments.
However, as indicated by transaction cost theory
(Williamson, 1985), transaction-specific invest-
ments also create the potential for opportunism
on the part of the transaction partner who has not
made the investment. When alliance partners make
symmetric investments in transaction-specific in-
vestments, this creates mutual lock-in and these
investments serve as credible commitments on the
part of both parties. But when transaction-specific
investments by alliance partners are asymmetric,
the firm that makes fewer investments in transac-
tion-specific assets will have greater bargaining
power (greater ability to appropriate the quasi-
rents) in future negotiations regarding the split of
the rents generated from those assets. This greater
bargaining power derives from the fact that the
alliance partner has invested in assets that are not
easily re-deployable to other uses.
Proposition 1c:
A firm in an alliance which has made fewer
investments in transaction-specific assets relative
to its partner, will increase its bargaining power
and appropriate a higher percentage of the
subsequent relational rents generated from an
alliance relationship.
GENERATING/APPROPRIATING PRIVATE
BENEFITS FROM AN ALLIANCE
RELATIONSHIP
Related Resources Perspective
We would also expect a firm to benefit differen-
tially from an alliance relationship depending on
the ‘relatedness’ of the firm’s other activities and
resources. Alliances generate ‘common benefits’
(gains) or benefits to both parties based upon the
alliance’s specific objectives as well as ‘private
benefits’ or gains that are realized only by
individual firms in the alliance (Khanna et al.,
1998). To illustrate, private benefits are realized
when a firm has other related resources and is able
to take resources or knowledge generated through
an alliance and transfer it to other business units/
divisions within the firm not directly related to the
alliance. Private benefits are those that a firm
can earn unilaterally by acquiring knowledge or
resources from its partner and applying them
elsewhere. Naturally, for a firm to generate private
benefits from the knowledge it has acquired from a
partner it must have other ‘related’ resources
within the firm. A company possesses resources
that are strategically related to the knowledge or
resources acquired from the alliance partner when
there is a commonality in one of the following
areas: customers (common customers with similar
demographics); channels; inputs and suppliers;
processes (similar product development, manufac-
turing or service processes); and technological
knowledge base (similar intellectual property,
technological know-how, market knowledge) (see
Markides and Williamson, 1996). This definition is
akin to the earlier and less extensive definition by
Rumelt (1974) in his early study of corporate
diversification. The work of Koh and Venkatra-
man (1991) explores the notion of relatedness
further in the context of alliances and argues for
higher benefits in related alliances.
Another way to operationalize relatedness is to
observe the frequency with which assets tend to
be combined in corporate portfolios under the
assumption that such resource combinations
are a source of economic rent. The merit of this
approach is that it does not require the researcher
to assign categories of relatedness, but instead base
it upon revealed relatedness patterns throughout
the economy on any given pair of industrial
activities. Bryce and Winter (2004) have taken
this approach to create a general relatedness index
that allows them to determine the relatedness
between pairs of industrial activities (or SICs)
within a firm’s portfolio. This promising line of
research would allow one to measure the degree of
relatedness between any two SIC codes in which a
company conducts business, including the related-
ness of a firm’s portfolio of businesses and the
specific business being conducted within an alli-
ance (Bryce, 2003).
In addition to the greater potential private
benefit in a related resource combination, the
firms involved would need to have a degree of
absorptive capacity to actually realize the benefit.
Thus, the successful acquisition of private benefits
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from an alliance is more likely to occur when:
(1) the firm’s scope of resources and activities is
more ‘related’ to the alliance’s activities (the firm
has more related resources), and (2) the firm has
developed absorptive capacity and effective intra-
organizational routines to facilitate intra-firm
knowledge and resource transfers. In addition to
resource relatedness, absorptive capacity, or a
firm’s ability to assimilate and utilize new external
knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) is neces-
sary for a firm to absorb and utilize the knowledge
it acquires from an alliance. In some cases a firm
may devote significant resources to acquiring
knowledge and resources from an alliance relation-
ship while its partner devotes few resources. Hamel
(1991) describes a number of cases where Japanese
firms acquired significantly greater knowledge and
benefits from its alliance relationships with US
firms because they devoted significantly greater
resources to acquiring knowledge. This suggests
that the relative absorptive capacity of alliance
partners will influence their ability to generate
private benefits from an alliance relationship (see
Lane and Lubatkin, 1998 for a discussion of
relative absorptive capacity).
To illustrate how related resources can affect the
distribution of gains in an alliance, we examine the
alliance between Apple Computer Inc. and Sony
Corporation to manufacture Apple’s successful
PowerBook line of portable computers. Before the
Apple–Sony alliance, Apple’s initial foray into
portables was the ‘Macintosh Portable’ which was
‘overpriced’ and ‘overweight’ and frequently de-
scribed as a ‘failure’ (BusinessWeek, October 28,
1991; p. 132). The Apple–Sony alliance linked
Apple’s capability at designing easy-to-use com-
puter products with Sony’s miniaturization cap-
ability, including the manufacturing know-how
necessary to make compact products. An article in
Fortune described the alliance as follows:
Apple Computer Inc. enlisted Sony Corp., the
Japanese consumer electronics firm, to design a
new notebook-size Macintosh computer called
the PowerBook. Sony’s engineers, who had
little experience building personal computers,
developed the machine in less than 13 months.
Apple approached Sony in late 1989 because it
did not have enough engineers to handle a flood
of new products planned for delivery in 1991.
From the beginning, the idea had the imprima-
tur of Sony’s president, Norio Ohga, who
assigned it top priority and watched over it
personally. Sony’s engineers are currently plan-
ning future members of the PowerBook family
(Fortune, November 4, 1991, p. 151).
Thus, Apple got Sony’s expertise in miniaturiza-
tion, while Sony learned more about the personal
computer (and specifically, the laptop) business
(InformationWeek, October 28, 1991, p. 63).
Although both Apple and Sony benefited from
the success of the PowerBook, it appears that Sony
ultimately realized greater total benefits (the sum
of common and private benefits) from the alliance
due to greater related resources. In addition to the
value generated from the PowerBook, Sony
realized greater private benefits due to synergies
between its consumer electronics business and its
growing computer business (e.g., computer moni-
tors, speakers, and now personal computers and
laptops). Sony used the alliance as an opportunity
to learn how to design and manufacture laptop
computers. It also learned how to manage product
development cycles that are much faster in the
computer industry than in consumer electronics
(Inkpen and Dinur, 1998). Before the Apple
alliance, Sony had little direct experience in
designing and manufacturing computers. Sony
has drawn on its experience with Apple to launch
its own independent entry into the personal
computer industry, including its popular line of
laptop computers. Sony’s stated strategy is to be
the preeminent brand in the living room as the
worlds of computers, communications, and con-
sumer electronics converge (BusinessWeek, May,
17, 1996, p. 100). By comparison, Apple did not
build new capabilities through the Sony alliance
outside of the computer business, nor did it have
related resources that became more valuable as a
result of the alliance. Most of the benefits it
derived came solely from the PowerBook (of
course, these were common benefits which were
substantial). However, due to its related resources
in consumer electronics and computers, Sony was
able to realize much greater private benefits from
the alliance than Apple.
The theoretical arguments above have found
some empirical support in a study of joint ventures
conducted by Koh and Venkatraman (1991) who
examined the stock market response to joint
venture announcements. In particular, they found
that parent firms with businesses related to the
joint venture (defined as similar products, markets,
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production technologies, or science-based re-
search) realized abnormal stock market gains that
were 10 times higher than for parents without
related business units. They conclude that ‘The
parent with the greatest number of businesses
related to a joint venture’s business derives more
benefits from the venture than the other parent or
parents’ (p. 885).
Proposition 2:
A firm whose scope of resources/activities is
more related to the alliance/network activities
(and which has a high level of absorptive capacity
and effective intra-organizational knowledge-
transfer routines) will appropriate a higher per-
centage of the total rents generated from an
alliance relationship.
STRUCTURAL HOLES PERSPECTIVE
Burt (1992) has offered a detailed description of the
structural holes perspective. Burt argues that the rate
of return that a firm earns is closely linked to the
social structure of its competitive arena. Each
player/firm has a network of contacts (e.g., custo-
mers, suppliers, competitors, etc.) in the competitive
arena and the structure of the player’s network and
the location of the player and its network contacts
influence the rate of return or profits that the player
can earn. Companies embedded in networks poten-
tially enjoy two kinds of benefits: informational
benefits and control benefits.
Information benefits of a network define who
knows what about potential business opportu-
nities that might exist among network members,
when they know, and who gets to participate in
them. Companies with a network optimally
structured to provide these benefits enjoy higher
returns because such players know about, and can
participate in, more rewarding business opportu-
nities. In addition, companies in a network can
derive control advantages by being (tertius gar-
dens) or one who is situated between two other
actors. Firms in the tertius role can create
advantages for themselves by brokering relation-
ships between other players who are not directly
connected to each other.
Structural holes refer to the separation or gaps
that exist between a firm’s non-redundant contacts
in a network. Thus, structural holes represent
entrepreneurial opportunities for information/
resource access and control. A network rich in
non-redundant contacts is rich in structural holes.
According to Burt (1992), companies that are
located in networks rich in structural holes and
that occupy positions that are central or structu-
rally autonomous in that network should enjoy
higher returns. The information and control
benefits that exist in a network emerge from the
wellsprings of structural holes in the network.
Following Burt (1992), we argue that two firms
in an alliance relationship who each possess a
different network of alliances will benefit differen-
tially from that relationship depending on
their position (e.g., centrality) within a network
of alliances or relationships. A firm that holds
a central or structurally autonomous position in a
network that is rich in structural holes will be
better able to exploit resource and information
differentials obtained through the alliance relation-
ship within the network. Thus, such a firm will
realize greater benefits from participating in the
alliance than a partner who does not possess a
large network of alliances and who does not
occupy a central position within that network.
This point is well illustrated by the Tata Group,
India’s largest business group with a presence
in a number of different industries such as steel,
automobiles, hotels, information technology (IT),
etc. Indian companies, both large and small,
possess strong capabilities in the IT field, especially
in the area of software development. Indeed,
Tata’s IT consultancy company recently went
public and achieved a market value of roughly
$10 billion, the largest IPO in India’s history.
However, to realize the full value of those
capabilities, Indian firms like Tata must often link
up with foreign firms who can provide business
opportunities in more lucrative foreign markets.
Many of the smaller Indian companies find it
difficult to establish direct relationships with large
foreign companies wishing to do business with
Indian firms. Instead, these large foreign firms are
more likely to work directly with large and visible
Indian firms, such as the Tata Group’s IT
company which acts as an important conduit for
enabling business between large foreign firms and
smaller Indian firms. The Tata Group has India’s
largest IT company with dozens of alliances with
foreign firms as well as with small domestic firms
with strong capabilities who find it difficult to
establish direct relationships with large foreign
firms. By virtue of its size and its long-term
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presence in this arena, the Tata Group IT
company occupies a central position in a network
of IT companies that is rich in structural holes,
internationally, but more so domestically.
A central position in a network of both domestic
and foreign IT firms rich in structural holes
enables the Tata Group IT company to appro-
priate a higher percentage of the gains generated
from its partnerships with the smaller Indian firms.
Through its alliances with foreign firms, the Tata
Group IT company enjoys better and privileged
access to information about new business oppor-
tunities in the international market, product
specifications and pricing, new developments in
relevant technologies, etc. Its central position also
allow it to retain control over this privileged
information as well as relationships. The informa-
tion and control benefits enjoyed by the Tata
Group IT company allows it to negotiate advanta-
geous terms with its smaller Indian partners when
they work together to service the needs of large
foreign customers. This translates into superior
returns for the Tata Group from its alliances, as
compared to its smaller domestic partners.
Proposition 3:
A firm(s) in an alliance/network that occupies a
position in the network that is rich in structural
holes and, therefore, can exploit resource and
information differentials will appropriate a higher
percentage of the rents generated from an alliance
relationship.
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE
The advantage of a firm’s information-rich posi-
tion in a network of alliances may go beyond its
ability to profitably broker information/resources
(structural holes perspective) and derive associated
private benefits. A firm’s membership and
position in an alliance network may also provide
the breadth of information necessary to enable
the firm to make important choices regarding the
types of resources it chooses to invest in develop-
ing for the future.
A firm that has developed a large number of
alliance relationships through which it can obtain
valuable knowledge will be able to obtain timely
and reliable non-public information from its net-
work of relationships. Consequently, the firm can
put together a unique picture about relevant future
market trends, opportunities and directions and,
more importantly, make critical decisions about
the types of resources the firm needs to invest in
and develop in order to pursue these opportunities
successfully. Of course, this depends in part on a
firm’s ‘sense-making’ capabilities, which refers to
the firm’s ability to understand, organize, and
make sense of the incoming knowledge, thereby
allowing the firm to accurately forecast future
economic conditions (e.g., future customer needs,
emerging technologies, high growth geographic
regions, etc; see Teece, 1998). However, assuming
that firms have equal ‘sense-making’ ability, firms
with greater amounts of non-public information
and/or information that is more accurate should
be in a better position to make investments in
resources and capabilities that will pay off in the
future. The resources and capabilities that a firm
chooses to develop as a result of the knowledge it
acquires from its network of alliance relation-
ships will generate benefits for the firm that
are indirectly related to any particular alliance.
Thus, these are private benefits that a firm with
a greater number of alliance relationships will
be able to enjoy which will not be available to an
alliance partner with a small number of alliance
relationships.
To summarize, a firm in an alliance network
with superior access to market information
through its network of alliance relationships
(centrality and breadth of ties) is likely to realize
greater private benefits from participating in a
network of alliances. Prior research has already
shown that firms that occupy central network
positions with greater network ties are more likely
to increase their number of alliances in the next
time period (Gulati, 1995; Koput et al., 1997;
Singh and Mitchell, 2005). But as we described
above, the benefit also stems not only from having
a great number of alliance relationships in the
future, but also more importantly, proportionately
increasing a firm’s ability to tap into a growing
number of non-public information sources that
each new tie provides, thereby allowing the firm to
identify relevant opportunities to deploy as of yet
undeveloped resources/capabilities that might be
valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate in the future.
Thus, we extend the primary argument of prior
research on this topic in an important way.
Extant strategy research has also underscored
how a firm needs to achieve a fine balance between
exploiting the current capabilities it possesses, and
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exploring the development of new capabilities that
it might need in future. The various rent genera-
tion and distribution perspectives proposed in this
paper address this same issue, albeit in the context
of a firms’ alliance network. The first three
perspectives, namely the resource dependence
perspective, structural holes perspective, and
related resources perspective, essentially highlight
the private ‘exploitation’ opportunities that a
firm’s alliance network presents the focal firm. In
contrast, the resource development perspective
underscores the private ‘exploration’ benefits a
firm potentially derives from its alliance network
and its central position in that network.
Microsoft is an example of a firm that has
dozens of alliances with technology firms and who,
as a result of its size and resources (e.g., operating
software, cash, etc.), occupies a central position in
the alliance landscape in the computing industry.
According to Doz and Hamel (1998, p. 233)
‘Microsoft has been able to enroll nearly the entire
information technology industry in its alliance
network.’ (This fact is reflected in a Fortune article
which argues ‘These Days, Everybody Needs a
Microsoft Strategy’; Fortune, 1998, p. 134.) For
example, Microsoft has more than 40 alliances
with Hewlett-Packard alone and is such an
important alliance partner that Hewlett-Packard
has assigned a full time executive to oversee its
alliances with Microsoft. Of course, this represents
just the tip of the iceberg as far as Microsoft’s total
number of alliances is concerned. Without con-
sciously trying, Microsoft uses its numerous
alliances to gather information on the market to
assist it with internal resource development.
Indeed, Microsoft’s decisions to enter both the
Internet Service Provider (ISP) business with MSN
to compete with AOL, as well as its decision to
enter the video game box industry with X-Box to
compete with Sony were arrived at in part through
information acquired through its alliance network
(this observation was made by a Microsoft
executive during an interview in August, 2004).
Its central position in its alliance networks gives
Microsoft access to more, and better, information.
Microsoft often uses these relationships to gather
information on where to invest in the future. In
fact, in interviews we have conducted with Micro-
soft’s alliance partners, some partner executives
have suggested that Microsoft is not a particularly
desirable alliance partner in terms of generating
common benefits in an alliance. Microsoft is often
described as hard to work with and in some cases
the partner indicated that Microsoft has used the
knowledge acquired through the alliance to devel-
op new, and perhaps competing, products or
services. Thus, Microsoft is able to use its central
and information-rich position in its network of
alliances to acquire information to help channel its
enormous software development and financial
resources toward appropriate internal resource/
capability development.
Proposition 4:
Firms that occupy an information rich position in
the network of alliances will be able to appropriate
a higher percentage of the gains generated from
any individual alliance relationship due to more
opportunities (due to more private information) to
determine which resources to develop in the future.
BALANCING COMMON AND PRIVATE
BENEFITS FROM ALLIANCES
In the discussion thus far, we have examined
common and private benefits in a separate manner
and have proposed different theoretical perspec-
tives that best explain the generation of each
relevant benefit. But since most firms are likely to
earn a certain degree of both private and common
benefits in any alliance, we can conceptualize
different partnering scenarios based on different
possible permutations of common and private
benefits. That is to say, common benefits could be
high or low, and private benefits could be high or
low for each focal firm in the alliance creating four
possible scenarios. In the various possible scenar-
ios, there are implications in some instances for
alliance longevity and performance. We address
each scenario sequentially (Figure 2).
The diagonal elements}high common and
private benefits, and low common and private
benefits}are relatively straightforward. In the
case of low common benefits and low private
benefits, the alliance would still be generating some
gains for each party, albeit small. Such instances
are unlikely to be stable in the long run because of
the relatively small payoffs in the alliance. Thus,
these alliances are characterized by low-intermedi-
ate stability.
The case of high common benefits and high
private benefits is the most desirable for all parties
in an alliance. Such situations are likely to be
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stable and relatively free of tension between
partners, since they are achieving positive and
substantial gains from the relationship. As a
qualifier to this situation, it is worth noting
that partner scarcity could come into play as a
constraint}such situations involve high degrees of
resource dependence, lower specific investments,
and high complementarity, which would apply to
only a select few of a full set of possible alliances.
In the case of low common benefit but high
private benefit for one partner, there are challenges
in terms of the asymmetry of benefit in the
alliance. While rationally speaking the relevant
basis of decision-making is the alliance versus the
focal firm’s alternative (not the partner’s payoff), it
is still possible that tensions would enter the
relationship due to the observed asymmetry and
perceived lack of equity (Arino and de la Torre,
1998). Such alliances would be the least stable of
the possible combinations.
The case of high common benefits but low
private benefit for one partner, presents an
interesting challenge. In such instances, a purely
rational assessment of the payoffs to each partner
would reveal a positive situation even for the
partner receiving a lower fraction of the total
payoff in the relationship, in that the absolute
magnitude of payoff to all partners will be high
(and presumably higher than their next best
investment alternative). However, in instances
where alliance performance measurement systems
are underdeveloped, it is possible that alliance
partners with a lower private benefit and high
common benefit would be dissatisfied with their
payoff structure. On average, though, instances of
high common benefits and low private benefits
would result in lower stability than that observed
in the case of high common and private benefits,
but higher than the other possible combinations of
common and private.
These arguments lead to the following proposition:
Proposition 5:
Contexts of high common and high private
benefits would yield the most stable alliances,
while contexts of low common and high private
benefits would yield the least stable alliances.
Situations of low common and low private benefits
and high common and low private benefits would
have intermediate levels of stability.
In the preceding discussion we have focused more
on alliance stability than rent appropriation. We
believe that alliance stability plays a role in
appropriation of rents particularly in conditions
where the alliance is unstable, because the time
frame for appropriating the benefits may be longer
than the actual duration of the alliance. The high
common benefit/low private benefit context is one
in which it is feasible that the rents from the alliance
may not accrue to the partners concerned, due to
the instability of the relationship. However, two
additional factors need to be considered. First,
what are the expectations of rent distribution and
how accurate are these estimates, and second, to
what extent can decision makers accurately assess
the likely rent distribution to the partner. In
instances where the estimates are reasonably
accurate, it is possible that the high common
benefit/low private benefit relationship could be
reasonably stable. Possible examples of this are
alliances between relatively small companies and
Wal-Mart for distribution of their products.2
Although Wal-Mart through its strong bargaining
power derived from scale and scope (related
resources), networks (structural holes), and re-
source development (alliance network) may earn a
larger proportion of rents, the common benefits are
high and the partner may be content with
low private benefits from the specific trans-
action.
CONCLUSION
Alliances are becoming increasingly important as
vehicles for improving economic performance and
creating competitive advantages. However, if firms













Figure 2. Private and common benefits and alliance
stability (Proposition 5).
J.H. DYER ET AL.146
Copyright # 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Manage. Decis. Econ. 29: 137–148 (2008)
DOI: 10.1002/mde
understand the factors that influence their ability
to appropriate the greatest gains from participat-
ing in alliances and networks. Our paper examines
four key ways that firms can appropriate more of
the gains through participating in alliances and
networks. More specifically, we argue that firms
will realize greater gains through participating in
alliances when they: (1) bring more critical and
scarce resources to the alliance; (2) have more
resources that are ‘synergy sensitive’ with the
common benefits realized through the alliance; (3)
occupy information-rich positions in an alliance
network with numerous structural holes; and/or
(4) use an information-rich position in a network
of alliances to acquire information to assist
in the development of internal resources or future
alliances.
In this article we contribute to the literature on
alliances by specifically delineating the factors that
drive differential payoffs from such relationships.
An additional contribution of this paper is that it
brings multiple perspectives to bear upon the
question of the determinants of alliance payoffs.
Our arguments incorporate resource dependence-
based considerations as well as considerations that
are drawn from the dynamic capability perspec-
tive, a transaction cost perspective and from a
structural view of the network the firm participates
in. This integrative approach is necessary because
each of these perspectives is limited in the scope of
considerations they identify as drivers of relative
gains from alliances.
We anticipate that future research will examine
a more dynamic perspective on the processes by
which partners in an alliance or network increase
their common and private benefits from such
relationships. Since many of the factors presented
in this discussion (such as asset specificity and
the presence of related resources) change over
time and also influence the nature of common and
private benefits, the incentives for partners to
invest in the relationship also change over time. As
a result, it is possible to envision scenarios in
which some alliances generate substantial value
over time in a positively reinforcing cycle, and
others in which the promise of the total gains
from an alliance is cut short by tensions arising
from perceived or real differences in proportion
of payoffs. Future research could also examine
the role of managerial cognition in these alliance
investment decisions: whether decision makers are
aware of changes in their network position over
time, and whether they determine their investment
decisions using strictly rational considerations
involving financial and strategic payoffs.
In conclusion, while relational rents have
received substantial attention over the past few
years, the same cannot be said for the question of
the distribution of such rents. In this paper, we
address this situation by positing factors that
influence the distribution of relational rents, and
some of their consequences for stability of
alliances. More empirical work is needed to
develop the empirical foundations of the proposi-
tions we offer in this paper, and to explore the
longitudinal impact of these payoffs on the
evolution of alliances and networks.
NOTES
1. Following Dyer and Singh (1998), we use the term
relational rent although technically speaking trading
partners generate quasi-rents. Peteraf (1994, p. 155)
defines quasi-rents as ‘returns that exceed a factor’s
short run opportunity cost. . .quasi rents are an excess
over the returns to a factor in its next best use.’ The
term ‘quasi-rents’ suggests that the rents are not
permanent in nature.
2. We thank our reviewer for this insight and example.
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